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Introduction: 
The 1983 American military intervention in Grenada was confusing to various 
groups of people. Many American citizens wondered why a country so tiny needed to be 
invaded. Many Grenadians thought that the motives lay in revenge for the murder of 
their beloved  leader Maurice Bishop, the former Prime Minister who had only days 
before been executed by the new government. The official reason given was to save the 
students of the medical school, where about 1000 Americans attended (Schultz 1993: 
324). However, the real, more complex reasons for intervention are what will be 
investigated here. The internal situation in Grenada was complicated with successive 
revolutions, leaving a regime which had deposed recent revolutionaries and appeared 
even more leftist, and lacked popular support (Lewis 1987:62). These conditions created 
a situation which was ripe for external intervention. When compared with the similarly 
timed revolution in Nicaragua, and a pattern of covert interventions in Latin America, 
the overt military action in Grenada is puzzling.  
Historically, there were many rationales for American interventions around the 
world, including containment of communism, filling power vacuums, and spreading 
democracy.  Containment was a strategy that focused on not allowing communism to 
expand any further than countries that were already espousing this view. It was the idea 
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of keeping communism limited, thus contained. The destruction of many previous 
colonial powers left the Third World in a destabilized state. Many of these areas, 
especially those where there were significant natural resources,  were a source of 
contention between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Areas where colonial power was gone were 
considered to be power vacuums. An example was the Middle East. No one had 
“control” over it, and therefore, both powers were afraid that power could be seized by 
someone else, giving them control over the region. Additionally, during the Cold War, 
the opposing ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union played a large role in 
various other international conflicts. After World War II, America and the Soviet Union 
were the leading powers. The opposing economic ideologies of capitalism and 
communism were a main source of tension between the superpowers. Each wanted to 
control as much as the world as possible, for various reasons including the security of 
being surrounded by allies. They also wanted to sway other countries to their type of 
economic system, making investment into their economies easier.   
Since most of Europe had been destroyed by the war and was financially indebted 
to the U.S., colonial power was weakening. Encouraged by the self-determination ideals 
expressed first by President Wilson, and revisited by America at the end of the war, 
many countries were searching for freedom from colonial rule in this post-war time 
period(Gaddis, 2005:88-91). Many of these countries were attracted to the idea of 
communism or socialism. The imperialist system of colonialism was what they knew as 
capitalism. This had not worked or been structured to work in their benefit, but for the 
colonial powers (Holsti 1995: 11) . In general, colonialism provided colonial powers with 
a market for their manufactured goods and a new source of raw materials. 
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Unfortunately, this is not a system that allows for economy building within a newly 
decolonized nation. Some measure of economic control can be gained by redistribution 
of land, but when led by the government, this often comes under the category of 
socialism. 
In this context of a destabilized world and power struggle between the U.S.A and 
the U.S.S.R., revolutions often became points of interest and parts of this larger power 
play. Any type of revolution was a destabilization, in a system that was precarious at 
best, and peace between the powers rested carefully on the concept of “Mutually 
Assured Destruction.” This stemmed from the terror of atomic weapons, and was the 
strategy created by McNamara that each side should attempt maximum casualties, in 
order for the fear to be greater than the desire to use the weapons(Gaddis, 2005:80). 
Each side was afraid that the other would use the destabilization to its advantage. Also, 
since the existing system was considered capitalist, the U.S. was afraid that part of the 
desire for change would include a change to communism.  
With these ideas in mind, I plan to examine in particular, the Latin American 
region, which was full of upheaval, and was an area for much American intervention, 
especially during the Reagan Administration. This administration had varying goals and 
conflicts about the region, which played into the actions taken there during the 1980s. 
Specifically, I plan to investigate why there was overt military action taken in Grenada, 
and not in other countries in Latin America, such as Nicaragua. In many ways, 
Nicaragua is representative of a more general regional pattern of covert operations and 
advisors, while Grenada seems different because of the overt action taken. The 
intervention in Grenada seems to be due to a combination of events that make it 
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possible for military presence with few repercussions. The unique situations 
immediately following the second (and much more violent) coup make an invasion both 
possible and desirable. The issue of intervention anywhere, and especially in Latin 
America, has many factors, which need to be put into context.  
 
Organization 
This project will begin with a look at the context, both historical and geopolitical. 
The case of Latin America during the Cold War needs to be looked at from various 
angles. First, the Cold War background and its relevance to intervention during the 
1980s will be discussed. American hegemony in the Western hemisphere as well as 
attitudes towards Latin America will also be relevant. The cases that I intend to 
investigate for this study are Grenada and Nicaragua. These two cases present different 
facets of American intervention. One shows the use of covert action, while the other 
shows overt use of military force. In Nicaragua, the complications arise from the fact 
that the Sandinista government had been recognized and given aid by the U.S., and it 
attempted to meet the requirements. Nicaragua also had a long history with American 
government, as the Somoza regime ousted by the Sandinistas was given preferential 
treatment for decades. In Grenada, the complications stemmed from successive 
revolutions and a lack of elections.  
These cases have a lot of commonalities as well. Both were economically 
depressed, and the revolutions sprung from a desire to develop economically as well as 
to remove a dictator. They were also openly opposed to being under American control or 
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influence. In fact, Bishop made statements to that effect, saying that they did not 
consider themselves as being in America’s backyard. This sentiment and open support 
of the Soviet Union in the UN against the Security Council’s condemnation of the 
invasion of Afghanistan, show linkages to the Soviet Union. Another concern was the 
close friendship between Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro, who felt that they had a lot 
in common with fellow Caribbean revolutionaries. Many of these similarities are 
commonalities throughout Latin America. The intervention in each can be used to help 
view U.S. intervention in Latin America, and in general, Cold War interventions (Payne 
1991). This project intends to look at the idea of American intervention based in part on 
the experiences of the people involved. Also, comparing Nicaragua and Grenada 
intervention cases should give a representative idea of both American military 
intervention and other forms of action and pressure used, especially in a Cold War 
context.  
 
Historical Context: The Cold War 
In the framework of American Cold War policy, why was Grenada a ground 
invasion as opposed to an approach using covert measures, which fits the more general 
intervention pattern in Latin America? This study will begin by looking at views on 
communism in the 1980s, and how this fits into the prevalence of intervention. As 
previously stated, most of American foreign policy from the 1940s to the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 was colored by the larger issue of the Cold War. A look into the 
American military intervention in Grenada, therefore, ought to begin with American-
Soviet politics, and the impact of this on the rest of the world.  
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Coming out of World War II as the two main victors and powers, relations 
between the new superpowers had been strained since before the war ended. The lack of 
trust between the former WWII allies was based on their opposing economic strategies, 
but also stemmed from the personalities involved. Stalin’s intense paranoia and the fear 
of the spread of communism in the West created a tension even during the war, which 
was magnified when the war was over. During the post-war period, the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. were faced with a rapidly decolonizing, destabilized world which both wanted 
to support their economic strategy.  
The attempts to control a world filled with nationalism and revolution took the 
forms of both economic and military activity. Sometimes, this was in the form of aid 
given to a country that seemed to have favorable views, or as sanctions against and 
interventions in countries that had opposite views (Gaddis 1982:15; Tucker 1992:6). 
Often, as in the case of Grenada, the first step was sanctions. This did not often work to 
sway a country from communism, since many needed economic assistance, and were 
further pushed towards the Soviet Union.  
Because many of the countries that were seeking agency and revolution during 
the Cold War had been colonies and did not have adequate economies, they needed 
economic assistance in order to improve their countries. Often the reason for revolution 
was tied to the economic depression and desperate poverty in these countries.  
One of the main American policies and watch words of the Cold War was 
containment. A central goal of American foreign policy during this period was to prevent 
the further spread of communism, believed to be emanating from the Soviet Union. 
Gaddis describes it as a strategy that intended to stop the Soviet Union from using its 
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post-war power, which was seen as possibly more dangerous and terrifying than Nazi 
Germany (Gaddis 1982:3-5). The mechanisms employed to prevent the spread of 
communism started with aid reduction to the Soviet Union at the end of the war (Gaddis 
1982: 17). As distrust increased and there was no longer the common goal of the war to 
hold them together, the two countries grew further apart. Fear of the spread of 
communism played a large role in the Korean War, and became a mainstay of American 
foreign policy. Any mention of socialism or communism in a country was met with an 
attempt to stop or prevent it. Because communism was seen as the ultimate threat, the 
United States backed many dictators who were said to have more favorable views. At the 
same time, governments that may have had popular support were viewed as dangerous 
if they had communist tendencies or goals. This was further complicated by the way that 
many changes which were unfavorable to American economic goals were labeled as 
dangerous and communist, even when this was not so. But, as will be discussed later, 
the economic relationships between the more and less developed countries were 
changing, and not always to the benefit of the developed nations. This change was not 
often met with American approval (Holsti 1995:11-12, Gaddis 1982: 30, 64).  
Part of the original stated vision of the Cold War was to prevent various areas of 
the world from becoming hostile to American goals. It was necessary for the 
continuation of American power to keep the governments of nearby countries lenient to 
American aims. Latin America fell into this category, but more discussion on American 
foreign policy as it pertains to Latin America will come later. The majority of Atlantic – 
bordering countries and areas where exports were needed by America, such as the 
Middle East, was on the list of countries to keep favorable. To this end, America got 
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involved in numerous conflicts over the decades.  This often included setting up various 
governments, provided that they would be loyal to America. This is one of the criteria 
that Kirkpatrick sees as the difference between dictators and authoritarian 
governments.  
“Only the intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left 
thinking prevent the intelligent men of goodwill form perceiving 
the facts that traditional authoritarian governments are less 
repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that thery are more 
susceptible of liberization, and that they are more compatible with 
U.S.  interests….There are, however, systemic differences between 
traditional and revolutionary autocracies that have a predictable 
effect on their degree of repressiveness. Generally speaking, 
traditional autocrats tolerate social inequalities, brutality, and 
poverty, whereas revolutionary autocracies create them.  
“Traditional autocrats leave in place existing allocations of 
wealth, power, status and other resources, which in most 
traditional societies favor an affluent few and maintain masses in 
poverty. But they worship traditional gods and observe traditional 
taboos….Such societies create no refugees. 
“Precisely the opposite is true of revolutionary Communist 
regimes. They create refugees by the millions because they claim 
jurisdiction over the whole life of the society and make demands 
for change that so violate internalized values and habits that 
inhabitants flee in the remarkable expectation that their attitudes, 
values, and goals will “fit” better in a foreign country than in their 
native land (Kirkpatrick, 1982:49-50).” 
 
  Kennan, who was a main architect of containment, felt that the main goal of 
foreign policy was American security. The strategy for pursuing security grew and 
changed over time. After each war, the strategy was revised, to prevent falling into the 
same traps, and to maximize the successes. Soviet aggression, however, was cast 
similarly each time, often with mentions of Cuba involved. 
 The ideas of American security by limiting the global influence of communism 
permeates most post World War II conflicts, which were mainly entered into due to 
containment strategy. In The Best and the Brightest, Halberstam looks at issues like this 
as drivers of the Vietnam War. There was a need to showcase American strength, and to 
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crush communism (Halberstam 1972: 72). These combined objectives played a role in 
the majority of Cold War armed conflicts. At the point of the Vietnam War, there was a 
break in the way the Congress and public looked at Cold War conflicts. Since allowing 
the executive and the military free rein seemed to have backfired, Congress became 
involved in policy-making in foreign affairs, and was mostly concerned with ensuring 
that America did not get entangled in a civil war. The public felt that the war had 
dragged on for too long, and doubted the decisions that got America into Vietnam 
originally. These led to a less interventionist view, and a desire to avoid involvement in 
the internal situations of other countries.  
The Vietnam War was seen by many as at best a mistake, and at worst, a failure. 
It appeared to be an imperialistic action to some Americans, who were not sure that the 
invasion was justified. Schulzinger describes it as a trauma, especially because it 
damaged the faith that Americans had in their leaders to make moral decisions. The idea 
that America had been the aggressor was disturbing to many. Immediately following the 
war, the Watergate scandal contributed to the growing sense that America could not 
trust its elected leaders to be honest and make moral judgments. Americans also became 
somewhat isolationist, not wanting to be involved in civil wars in other countries, which 
was one view of the Vietnam War that Americans were left with. (Schulzinger 2001: 374, 
382).  In the post-Vietnam Cold War, all interventions were under the shadow of 
Vietnam. There was a concerted effort not to end up in a similar situation. This led to a 
certain amount of wariness to use military force. Conflicts that came after had to be 
obviously different, and not pose the threat of getting tied up in an internal conflict. This 
is due in large part to the hesitancy of both the American people and Congress to get 
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involved in another long-running war, without a clear goal and “exit strategy”. Against 
this background, the Reagan administration combined the idea that Soviet aggression 
was a lasting, powerful threat; with a renewed zeal to display American military might 
(Tucker 1992: 3). The wish to oversee the presidency,  especially in foreign policy 
matters, coincided with scrutiny of the situation in Central America (Arnson 1993:22).  
Post-Vietnam conflicts were all partially a reaction to the idea of it as failure, which the 
Reagan Administration wished to change. 
 The Reagan administration had a different view of intervention than many 
American citizens, and was more concerned with making sure communism was not only 
contained, but also prevented from spreading into the Western Hemisphere.  Returning 
a sense of confidence in the executive, especially in military and foreign policy decisions, 
was one of the issues the Reagan Administration struggled with. The American public 
and Congress were reluctant at best to get involved in international issues, especially 
those that seemed to be internal conflicts (Arnson 1993: 59). Therefore, the 
administration had to make Vietnam appear like less of a poor policy decision, and to 
make everyone more comfortable with the use of force. The use of force had to be 
divorced from the idea of failure. Also, a main Cold War tenet was proving military 
might to the Soviet Union.  
One way to do this was to change the way that Vietnam was looked at. It seemed 
like an unnecessary intervention, and many were confused as to whether the decision to 
enter into the war, and the continuous prolonging were wise decisions. By saying that 
the Vietnam War was a “noble cause,” Reagan was trying to recapture the idea of 
America as a heroic nation, and getting rid of the crippling visions of invasion and defeat 
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(LeFeber, 1993: 280). In order to be able to enter into more conflicts, the administration 
had to make Vietnam seem like less of a failure. This would help to restore confidence in 
the presidency, and change the atmosphere of fear and distrust surrounding foreign 
interventions.  
  
Economic Context: Latin America and Dependency 
 Imagine dependency as a city, surrounded by rural areas. The rural areas contain 
farms that produce the raw materials for the city. In exchange for these needed 
materials, the city sends the country dwellers various manufactured goods. 
Unfortunately, the factory products are more expensive than the fruit and vegetables 
produced by the rural areas, so the city is continually richer than the country. Also, the 
control over setting the prices of both the produce and the manufactured products is in 
the city.  In this allegory, the city is the United States, and the countryside Latin 
America. It would appear that the relationship that the U.S. has had with Latin America 
has been one of this nature.  
As part of the sphere of influence recognized by Kennan, Latin American 
economic and political systems have long been influenced by America. This idea, 
although phrased differently, was a long standing one. Starting with the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823, America has felt that the rest of the Western Hemisphere looked to it 
for protection, and provided this, assisting them to maintain their independence from 
the European powers. Along with this protection came varying degrees of economic and 
David Page 12 
 
political involvement, including easy access to the mostly agricultural products of these 
nations.  
Latin America was in a tumultuous and revolutionary state after WWII. Anything 
that seemed like it would be economically unfavorable to America was dealt with 
severely. As stated previously, communism and containment were the major issues of 
the post WWII period in American foreign politics. Therefore, governments that seemed 
to be leaning towards communism, were believed to be threats, and part of a Soviet 
desire to have bases in the Western hemisphere especially. Due to these national 
security concerns, it appeared that the requirements for American aid and assistance 
within the region were a strong anti-communist stance in the region, and support of 
U.S.  policies. Governments that did not have strong anti-communist policies, and 
seemed more intent on internal reform, were frequently targeted for overthrow, or at 
least, treated with great skepticism.  
 The first example is Cuba in the 1950s. The dictatorship run by Batista was not 
only allowed, it was assisted, as it furthered both capitalism and American investment. 
When there appeared to be a revolution in the making, the U.S. first attempted to shore 
up the Batista government, and then to put together a new military based regime when 
it no longer seemed possible to save the Batista regime. The U.S. tried by all possible 
means to prevent Fidel Castro from gaining control of the government. When Batista 
refused to step down, both covert and overt means were used in the attempt to prevent 
Castro’s rule.  These attempts proved unsuccessful, however, and led to the U.S. taking a 
stronger role in the region, continually attempting to prevent “another Cuba” (Morley 
1994:9-12).  
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The next example of America’s attempt to maintain its hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere is the Dominican Republic. During the 1960s, the Trujillo government 
became more repressive. American officials in the Eisenhower administration became 
concerned that dissatisfaction would grow within the country, and lead to a situation 
similar to Cuba. When Trujillo was assassinated by Dominican nationals who were 
connected to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration, America took advantage of 
the situation, and assisted in training a military that would lead to the creation of a 
military state. This military was instrumental in the overthrow of the Juan Bosch, a 
social reformist who did not support American policies in the region. After Bosch, a 
three-member oligarchy was installed, which was more favorable to American policies, 
and further right, therefore not a communist threat (Morley 1994:12-15).  
Yet another example was Brazil in the early 1960s. Under the new government of 
Jaoa Goulart, reforms and programs instituted to assist the poor and working class 
made those of upper classes feel threatened. The United States put pressure on the 
government through a variety of means. Not only were anti-Goulart candidates 
supported, but the loans approved even by non-governmental organizations were 
delayed and were not received during a time period of economic instability. Politically, 
the CIA and the AFL-CIO were also involved in campaigning against Goulart with 
propaganda, and support of military officials who were opposed to his rule. The coup 
that took place in 1964 was instigated by the U.S., and the new government was fully 
supported with aid from both America and various organizations(Morley 1994:15-19).  
The hegemonic economic relationship between the U.S. and Latin America 
continues with the involvement of the United States in the overthrow of the Chilean 
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government in the early seventies. Similarly to other cases, when the socialist Allende 
was elected, the U.S. began both economic and propaganda campaigns with the intent of 
destroying the regime. A large part of this subversion involved training and using the 
armed forces against the government. They were given aid and were eventually part of a 
coup that overthrew Allende. Once the new government was in place, it was largely 
beholden to American ideas, and started by eradication of the social and economic 
reforms instituted under Allende (Morley 1994:19-23).  
Despite this history of intervention, the strategy used depends on the 
government. The amount of change to the status quo, both within the country and in 
interactions with former allies, play a large role in the policies espoused by the U.S. 
towards various countries. New governments that uphold the economic hierarchies and 
ally systems of their predecessors seem like much less of a threat, and therefore are not 
pressured as severely. Change is to be kept as moderate as possible( Morley 1994: 218-
219).  
  Dependency theory is a way of looking at the economic system created under 
colonial rule and later taken over by America, in which Third World or periphery 
countries are mainly consumers of factory goods and exporters of raw materials. Since 
the raw materials (based on prices set in the advanced, colonizing countries) are 
generally worth less than the factory goods, the terms of trade are bad and eventually 
get worse as the factories become more efficient. The cost of manufactured goods 
increases at a much faster rate than raw materials, so that these countries never have 
enough wealth (Holsti, 1995:10-12).  Even with decolonization, it is very difficult to get 
out of this system, as there is nothing on which to base a large structural change in the 
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economy. Locals who have some amount of elite status, often acquired it under colonial 
rule, by buying into this system. Therefore, they stand to gain from the perpetuation of a 
dependent system.  
Leading up to the 1970s, the economic situation in Central America changed. 
There was a push to become more integrated into the world capitalist economy, which 
meant that there was a greater focus on the exportation of agricultural products. This 
required using more land for these products, and therefore led to some redistribution of 
land. Less of it was able to be used for subsistence farming, and more went towards 
“cash crops.” This led to a concentration of access to wealth, especially in the form of 
fertile land. Also, it led to changes in occupation, from subsistence farming to wage-
laborers or urban city workers. As disparities in the distribution of wealth, especially 
wealth in the form of arable land, grew, there was an increase in poverty and 
dissatisfaction in Latin America, according to Booth (1991: 35). The growth of the 
working or lower class, along with decreased access to sources of wealth led to attempts 
for change. These struggles, sometimes in the form of unionization, were not often 
successful. Instead, they were often met with violence, increasing the frustration and 
anger of those participating. This was a pattern seen in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala. The lack of satisfaction from these original attempts at taking back some 
economic power led to more solidified and systemic state opposition.   
 Therefore, in Latin America, there has not been a very favorable history with 
capitalism. It could be seen more as a system which prevents progress than a system 
which increases agency and market freedom (LeFeber 1993: 17; Morales 1994). Since the 
main exports of the region tend to be agricultural, and thus non-industrial or raw 
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products, there is a history of balance of payment problems. There are two main reasons 
for this issue. First, the prices of agricultural products are based mostly on the demand 
of those importing them, and therefore, in the control of more developed nations that 
import such things as tropical fruit. Secondly, the prices of industrial products are 
higher, and also set in the industrialized nations. The prices of industrial products tend 
to increase, while the prices of agricultural products (and other raw materials) tend to 
remain low (LeFeber 1993:17 ; Lewis 1987). In Latin America, modernization and 
moving away from mostly agricultural products is difficult at best. Because there is a 
demand for the exports of these countries (sugar, fruit, spices), there is little incentive 
for the U.S. to have them reduce the agricultural sector of their economy. With 
capitalism seen as a block to progress, many found socialism an attractive alternative 
(Heine 1991: 4; LeFeber 1993:18). 
It has been argued, however, that dependency does not necessarily always have a 
detrimental effect. It is sometimes connected to economic growth and improvements. In 
looking at two different studies, Ray and Webster showed that the correlations were 
tenuous at best, and could be either somewhat positive or somewhat negative. 
Therefore, there may be other economic issues taking place like perhaps a lack of 
infrastructure, and various national disasters. (The region is prone to hurricanes and 
there was also a massive earthquake in Managua in 1972). They do however, admit that 
foreign investors make more than they invest (Ray & Webster 1992:507-513).  
In the Western Hemisphere, America has a history of hegemony (LeFeber 1993: 
19). Especially with the southern part of the hemisphere, America has attempted to 
protect and maintain economic control of their raw materials. Since the 1800s, America 
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has felt that the southern part of the hemisphere was its ‘backyard” and considered the 
other countries in a paternalistic fashion. Partly, this was felt to be in the best interest of 
these countries. Due to the vested interest America has in the governments of these 
countries, it has a long history of intervention. Geopolitically, as nearby states, it is wise 
to ensure that the governments of the Latin American nations are favorable to American 
policy. Having close states that are not allies can lead to feelings of danger, especially 
given the tensions of the Cold War. Economically, since many of them export mainly to 
America, it is important to maintain compatible economic systems. Land redistribution, 
for example is an issue because it makes the large scale farming of cash crops more 
difficult. This prevents these countries from developing more diverse economies, which, 
in turn, keeps them dependent on the more developed nations for consumer goods and 
factory products. The lack of agency inherent in this system is what pushes many 
countries away from maintaining a capitalist economic system. Especially when political 
agency has been found, a lack of economic agency can be very frustrating.  
Under these conditions, a sense of being mistreated and oppressed by the state 
was harbored by various groups of citizens. This eventually leads to revolutionary ideas 
and activities. In The cases examined here, the stat did not give much political or 
economic agency. This caused increasing tensions, which culminated in revolutions. 
Since the governments installed after these revolutions did not seem to be favorable to 
American economic policies, and were socialist in nature, they were targeted for 
destruction like many of the other socialist leaders of the region. Once the “mistake” had 
been made in Cuba, the other Latin American countries needed to remain closely 
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connected to the U.S. or else face severe pressures that often resulted in the installation 
of a military state.  
 
What Happened: Revolution in America’s Backyard 
All around the world, and especially in the Caribbean region, Cuba and the Soviet 
Union were considered to be the main instigators of any socialist-leaning revolution. 
This made action against these revolutionaries serve two ideological purposes. First, it 
was seen as a strike at the Soviet Union and monolithic communism.  Secondly, it would 
not be viewed as yet another instance of intervening in another country’s internal 
affairs, which was not something that the public wanted to engage in (LeFeber, 1993). In 
any situation where aid could be traced to Cuba and the U.S.S.R., the revolution was 
seen as hostile. This, however, was a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, since revolutions 
overthrowing U.S.-backed dictators were often responded to with economic sanctions by 
the U.S. As previously stated, dictators that were not communist were often supported 
by America as being preferable to the alternative. This often pushed countries into 
asking for Soviet aid. Once they had done so, America was able to state that they had 
been communist and Soviet-inspired and driven all along. Since it was felt that 
economic and governance systems could be imposed from outside, the Soviet Union was 
generally believed to be exporting communism (LeFeber 1993; Gaddis 1982: 42).  
The main problem with the continued desire to turn the post-War decolonization 
and power struggles away from communism was the failure of the capitalist system and 
the “free market” to assist these smaller, often agricultural -based economies (Gaddis 
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1982:17 ; LeFeber 1993).  Since they were set up under colonialism as another market 
for consumer products and to provide imports that were not readily available in Western 
Europe, former colonies had found capitalism not to lead to an increase in their wealth 
so much as an increase in the wealth of the colonial center due to them (Holsti 10, 1995). 
Especially if this is looked at as a zero-sum game (meaning that the amount of wealth is 
constant) then the colonial centers and other developed nations were becoming wealthy 
at the expense of the colonies. Therefore, there was a certain amount of disenchantment 
with capitalism, and a lack of trust in it as a system that could provide the agency 
desired to improve their countries. Socialism appeared to be a system that would help 
the impoverished people of these countries to at least have enough to survive, which was 
tempting to those who wished to improve living conditions in these countries.  
In the Latin American region, there was a similar pattern of planning for 
disruption of the revolutionary governments. During the Carter administration, there 
was more positive coercion, in attempts to win over revolutionaries to capitalist ideals. 
Under the Reagan administration, however, it was deemed important to prevent and 
crush the spread of communism, so a more negative approach was taken. Since trying to 
win over revolutionaries had not worked, the revolutions needed to be crushed. Due to a 
desire to not have ground troops engaged in battle in Central America, this was often 
through subversion. There were long-range plans involving military training of ex-
patriots of Latin American countries, and the training, arming and financing of counter-
revolutionary groups, such as those willing to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.  
Although there was a lack of understanding or an intentional lack of insight into the 
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internal situation that creates revolutions, there was a lot of planning for infiltration and 
overthrow (LeFeber 1993).  
The Latin American region was also considerably destabilized during the 
seventies and eighties. Because of rapid decolonization, the Caribbean was still working 
out systems of governance and economy. Although less recently decolonized, Central 
America was dealing with extremes of poverty, and, in some cases, exploitative 
governments. There were economic problems, and continued instances of guerilla 
warfare. The Reagan Administration attempted to deal with economic instability with 
aid packages, especially to countries seen as favorable to American aims. Nicaragua, for 
example, had been receiving American economic aid since the carter administration, 
partially in an attempt to make the Sandinista government more favorable to 
Washington. When the instability exploded into revolution, however, the situation was a 
little more difficult for the United States to navigate. In Grenada, for instance, poverty 
and instability was followed by a Marxist regime, desiring change and improvement of 
economic conditions.  
 
Research Design 
The research for this project began with secondary sources. I intend to provide 
background by explaining Cold War sentiment, showing the conflicts between America 
and the Soviet Union. It will be shown here that the American policy of containment 
played a large role in the interventionist mentality. Since the spread of communism 
needed to be prevented, it was vital to ensure that it did not spread close to American 
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borders. Also, starting during World War II, America and the Soviet Union had a lack of 
trust in their relationship, which only became worse once the war was over and there 
was no reason for alliance left. These two super powers had opposing ideologies, and 
each wanted to have as much of the world in their camp as possible. This led to other 
countries getting caught in this power play (Gaddis 1982: 30; Lewis 1987).  
The next portion of the project is also setting the stage, by looking at the 
aftermath of Vietnam, and its specific bearing on American foreign policy. This portion 
focuses on secondary sources like Schulzinger’s A Time for Peace; The Legacy of the 
Vietnam War. This segment of the paper shows how the considerations of the Vietnam 
War affected Reagan’s vision of the post war revolutionary world. In dealing with a large 
amount of decolonization, many countries felt that the democracy-sanctioned 
governments that they had were not effectively caring for the needs of the people. 
 
Factors to Consider 
In looking at the cases of Grenada and Nicaragua, there are several important 
factors that affect the cases. While trying to figure out why these two interventions took 
such different courses, the internal situations of the countries have to be analyzed. The 
fact that there was an intervention in both is already a large similarity, which suggests 
other commonalities. 
  The variables to look at here are the causes of intervention. These include 
linkages to the Soviet Union and Cuba, including the flows of both armaments and 
money. This is to be expected, since neither revolution was in anyway sanctioned or 
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approved of by the U.S., but needed money and arms. This should be looked at in 
economic documents, and primary sources on what was going on in these countries, 
since they were being sanctioned and monitored.  Also, the presence of Cuban or Soviet 
military personnel should be looked into. This provides for another measurement of ties 
to communism. In Latin America, it was not unusual to have mostly weaponry and 
financial support from the U.S.S.R, while being provided with advisors, troops, and 
more weapons from Cuba.  
 Additionally, the statements made by the new revolutionary governments are 
important. Openly communist sentiment, and the occurrence of elections are to be 
investigated. This can be seen in the new constitutions and statements released by the 
new governments. Since they were often overthrowing a U.S. recognized government, 
the revolutionaries were under economic sanctions from America and therefore had to 
apply to the U.S.S.R. for some sort of economic support. Economic support would be 
seen as ties or linkages, and this therefore led to a feeling that these governments 
needed to be subverted or removed. In Nicaragua, although the government had Marxist 
roots, there was an attempt at maintaining good relations with the U.S. This was 
somewhat less of the case in Grenada, where despite a similar need for economic 
assistance, the system of relationship between America and Latin America was being 
challenged.  
Also, the size and training of the military forces of each country would be useful 
to investigate as a factor shedding light on reasons for different interventions. In 
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas had been fighting for years, and were experienced at guerilla 
warfare. In Grenada, however, the revolution was incredibly brief, to surprise, perhaps, 
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of even the revolutionaries. A less entrenched military force made Grenada an easier 
military target. The recent dissent leading to massacre in Grenada made the government 
less stable, and the populace more favorable to some kind of intervention. The situation 
had reached a critical stage, and the people were no longer fully in support of the 
government. Although this seems to be a minor factor, it is an important one, because a 
populace that is sympathetic will find ways to aid and assist an army, as was often the 
case in Vietnam. In Nicaragua, the people were more connected to and in favor of the 
government, as opposed to Grenada, where there had been a large amount of faith in 
Bishop, but the government no longer had nor curried the favor of the people after his 
murder.  A comparison of the overall populations would be a place to begin, along with 
the actual records of the battle in Grenada, and data collected from those who were sent 
to infiltrate the Sandinista regime.  These factors all seem to have led to the ground 
invasion in Grenada, which was seemed unusual among the pattern of covert operations 
in Latin America. They also help to explain intervention in Latin America in general 
(Lewis1987: 11-13& 50). 
Another important aspect is the ground situation in each of these countries – the 
internal situations that cause revolutions that appear dangerous. What is important here 
is the behavior of their various dictators, and the economic situations that created an 
atmosphere ripe for revolution. It seemed that America had taken these revolutions as a 
personal affront. In some aspects, this is justified, because part of the status quo that the 
revolutionaries were struggling to throw off was the system of dependencia (Holsti 1995: 
10-13,). As described earlier, this was part of colonially instituted system that kept the 
Third World in need of many good from the First World, including sometimes food, 
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since the growing of cash crops leaves little room for any type of subsistence farming. 
This was part of the system that created an environment for the growth of revolution. 
The institutionalization of exploitation made progress hard in these countries, and the 
governments that were in place were sanctioned because they had had good trade 
agreements with America (Joefield-Napeir, 1991: 87-99).  
 
Cases 
The cases that I investigate for this study are Grenada and Nicaragua. These two 
cases present different facets of American intervention. One shows the use of covert 
action, while the other shows overt use of military force. These cases have a lot of 
commonalities as well. Both were economically depressed, and the revolutions sprung 
from a desire to have better economies as well as removal of a dictator. They were also 
openly opposed to the situation of being under the control of America. In fact Bishop 
made statements to that effect, saying that they did not consider themselves as being in 
America’s backyard. This and open support of the Soviet Union in UN against the 
Security council’s condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan, lead show linkages to 
the Soviet Union. Another concerning characteristic was the close friendship between 
Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro, who felt that they had a lot in common as fellow 
Caribbean revolutionaries. Many of these similarities are commonalities throughout 
Latin America. The intervention in each can be used to help view U.S. intervention in 
Latin America, and in general, Cold War interventions (Payne 1991).  
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Having set the stage, I will show that economic depression and the emergence of 
a college-educated student class led to unrest, and resentment within these countries. 
Once these governments are in place, their actions and interactions with the rest of the 
world often confirmed the American fears that they were socialist governments with ties 
to the Soviet Union and Cuba, and that they could be used as launching pads for further 
spreading communism. Domino theory, which was so prevalent during the Vietnam 
War, never really was retired. It was not restated in the same way, but a main fear after 
the Cubna revolution was that more countries in the Caribbean area would become 
communists. A fear of this is seen in the allegations that Nicaragua was assisting the 
Salvadoran revolution, as well as in the threat of the international airport being built in 
Grenada (Lewis 20-25, 1987).  
  The obvious communist linkages of these governments caused the U. S. to feel 
threatened. The sentiments of the Reagan administration on both revolutions and 
countries that attempted to go against the established system of democracy and 
American hegemony was seen as dangerous. Also, Reagan felt that Carter had not been 
harsh enough on Nicaragua and on foreign policy in general. He wanted to prove to the 
world to some extent, that American military might was still prevalent. Also, according 
to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a serious force in the Reagan government, dictators that followed 
American trade agreements and did not really bother anyone outside of their circle, 
were acceptable, and friendly. This was generally the Cold War argument that was made 
for the backing of regimes with terrible human rights violations, but were not actually 
communist.  
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Unfortunately, this did not turn out as expected, and the authoritarian 
governments proved no more amenable to change than their dictatorial counterparts. 
Instead, both were highly oppressive, and the U.S. justification for those that it had 
backed was weakened. What was left was to say that it was an improvement on 
Communism. When these authoritarians were replaced by leftist revolutionaries, they 
became more dangerous. This section will rely on some memoirs, including George 
Shultz’s Turmoil and Triumph; My Years As Secretary of State. It will also contain 
secondary sources, and some primary documents on foreign policy decision made 
during this time frame. It will include analysis of the two revolutions that took place, 
especially Nicaragua, since there was a long history of American support for the Somoza 
government.  
I will lead into the actual investigation of the cases with a look at the history of 
American relationships with Latin America, which should show a certain predisposition 
to intervention or general interference. Based in part on proximity, America had a 
vested interest in the politics and economics of Latin America, and assuring both the 
flow of their agricultural goods, and that their governments would remain favorable. 
Castro’s Cuba was seen as almost a blemish and a failure (LeFeber 110, 1993).  
The next area to investigate is the internal situation in each country. This will be 
assessed using the variables stated above, to understand the causes of intervention. 
What will be interesting to look at here is not only what causes intervention, but what 
internal factors are related to the type of intervention that eventually took place. I intend 
to show that the collapse of the People’s Revolutionary Government and the massacre of 
Bishop and many of his supporters, created an atmosphere in which some kind of 
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intervention was called for. In Nicaragua, the government seemed more stable, and 
therefore, was harder to attack with overt force. The fighting force was also far more 
entrenched, as the revolution was long and bloody. Also, in Grenada, there was little 
semblance of safety for citizens or others on the island. The prior situations of economic 
depression, and economic destruction by previous leaders are also similarities that 
cause the revolutionaries to want an entirely different system (Joefield-Napier 86-95, 
1991; Kimmens 47-50, 1987).  
The policies of both governments that seemed to be objectionable to America, as 
well as their ties to known communist governments will be examined here. What was 
actually taking place within the countries and their governments seems like a very 
salient matter that would be the deciding factor to intervene. Having already shown a 
certain predisposition towards intervention, especially in this region, the internal 
situation should prove to be the deciding factor for intervention. This section consists of 
various primary sources, including documents from the time, statements by or memoirs 
of  government officials, both American and Latin American. There will also be some use 
of secondary sources. In this section I intend to compare the two cases, and show that 
the similarities are possibly regional, and the differences, peculiar to the unique 
experience of instability that each felt.  
 
Nicaragua Case 
Nicaragua was controlled by the Somoza family for a large part of the twentieth century, 
until the revolution in 1979. Between 1937 and 1979, they were either in power, or 
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seemed to have a lot of control over decisions made. Although General Anastasio 
Somoza took a brief hiatus from 1947 to 1950, as Minister of War he was still in control 
of the armed forces, which, seems to be where most of the power for control lay in 
Nicaragua. Looking at the period which leads up to the Nicaraguan Revolution, 
therefore, involves a look at the Somoza family. Since, as Booth relates, the state 
becomes a political actor against which revolutionaries, formerly dissatisfied citizens, 
begin to mobilize, the governance and position of the state of Nicaragua is an integral 
part of the dissatisfaction that grows to revolution.  
 Due to a strong anti-communist stance, Somoza was backed and funded by the 
United States, at a time, as discussed above, when the main foreign policy issue was the 
Cold War and prevention of the spread of communism. Since they all maintained a 
strong stance against communism and were not seeking Soviet aid, the Somozas were 
seen as less of a threat to American foreign policy and security issues than a government 
that was more populist, but was socialist, or appeared to lean in that direction. Much of 
the turmoil between Nicaragua and other Latin American countries during the Cold War 
had to do with Communism. In Guatemala in 1954, where communism was thought to 
be getting a bit of a hold, Nicaragua was among four other countries (the others being El 
Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela) suspected by the government to be 
planning an invasion.  
 Anti-communism was not the only reason that the U.S. supported the Somoza 
regime, although it did play a very large part. Nicaragua was also helping to further both 
political and economic aims of the United States in the region. Backing in the 
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Organization of American States and maintenance of an open economy (Morley, 
1994:35) 
Table 1 – Nicaragua Chronology 
2/12/1950 Somoza decides to run again in upcoming elections on 5/21 
5/6/1950 President Roman y Reyes dies in U.S.A. 
5/7/1950 Somoza is selected as president of Nicaragua 
5/21/1950 Somoza wins election – reward for voting for him is a card required to work in 
most businesses 
5/2/1951 Somoza takes oath of office to become Nicaraguan president  
11/15/1953 Somoza insists he is not a dictator 
  
4/5/1954 Martial law declared after an assassination attempt on Somoza fails 
4/7/1954 Six rebels and 2 national guards killed in restoring order after assassination 
attempt 
 Somoza changes constitution to allow him to run for reelection  
11/19/1954 Repeal of exchange taxes to increase trade 
1/11/1955 Nicaraguan troops invade Costa Rica, after months of friction 
8/9/1955 Uncertainty as Somoza seems to pursue reelection while allowing negative views 
of his candidacy in the press 
9/21/1956 Somoza is wounded in an attempted assassination 
9/29/1956 Somoza dies and his son, Luis Somoza Debayle, inherits the presidency 
2/24/1959 Opposition forces to Somoza government sign an agreement of solidarity with 
each other 
2/5/1963 Schtick wins elections in Nicaragua as part of Somoza party, but in accordance 
with new law that would not put a Somoza in power for a 4-year term 
2/7/1967 Anastasio Somoza Debayle wins election and becomes president 
1968 Central America has economic decline 
8/31/1971 Congress dissolves itself, transfers power to Somoza until assembly is formed to 
change constitution next year 
4/8/1972 Junta selected to take control of Nicaragua when Somoza steps down 
5/1/1972 Somoza steps down and Triumvirate takes control 
12/24/1972 Massive earthquake in Managua – high death toll and America sends aid 
9/3/1974 Somoza reelected  
12/29/1974 Leftist revolutionaries crash a party, kill 3 guards and capture more than 20 
hostages 
12/31/1974 Revolutionaries free hostages and fly to Cuba 
1/24/1975 Somoza blames Castro for the spread of socialist revolution in the region 
8/2/1975 Guerrillas in Nicaragua grow in numbers 
3/1/1977 Bishops of Nicaragua accuse Somoza’s regime of cruelty towards civilians in 
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fighting leftist guerrillas, including rape, torture and executions 
10/20/1977 Somaza’s regime uncovers a coup plot; guerrillas say that they want to overthrow 
Somoza and hold elections 
10/30/1977 Sandanistas win backing from non-Marxist groups and Somoza regime seems 
unstable 
1/10/1978 Pedro Chamorro Cardenal, long-time editor of an anti-Somoza newspaper, is shot 
and killed while driving 
1/12/1978 Riots break out after the funeral of Cardenal 
1/24/1978 Strike called to protest Cardenal’s murder 
1/26/1978 Somoza’s resigination called for 
9/14/1978 Military rule instituted as fighting continues in Nicaragua 
7/12/1979 Revolutionaries promise elections in Nicaragua 
7/19/1979 Somoza overthrown 
12/1981 Reagan decides to support contras 
4/1/1981 Reagan confirms Carter’s decision not to send aid to the Sandanistas 
4/10/1982 Nicaragua gets aid from Soviets 
3/26/1983 Sandinistas accuse U.S. of attempting to overthrow their government and of 
attempting to destabilize their economy 
3/29/1983 U.S. is alone in professing the belief that conflict in Nicaragua is strictly internal, 
U.S.S.R. accuses U.S. of funding and arming rebels 
4/1984 Nicaragua brings U.S. to International Court of Justice 
 
 
 The second term of General Somoza began and ended abruptly, and was marked 
by conflict and strife throughout. (see table 1)  In 1950, after he had declared that he 
would run again in the May elections, the current president, Roman y Reyes, passed 
away. His untimely death on May 6, 1950, was barely weeks before the scheduled 
election on May 21st. Somoza was selected by the Congress as president on May 7th, and 
went on to win the election. This election, although allegedly free, did not give people 
much of a choice. Although there was an opposition party, the ballots were not secret, 
and voting for Somoza resulted in a card needed for work. Although it seems that 
economic issues increased later, jobs were still a necessity. Therefore, there was a strong 
economic coercion to vote for Somoza, despite the opinions that may have been held on 
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his ability to govern. Since the ballots were not secret, it seems dangerous at best to vote 
against such a powerful candidate in a state that could be described as a police state. 
This makes the election not truly free, since voting against Somoza could cause at the 
very least, a loss of ability to work, and even possibly persecution and violence later.  
Despite this, in 1952, he expressed that he did not feel that he was a dictator. 
Since he was educated in the United States, he had an idea of the freedoms in America. 
Somoza stated that there was a lot of freedom in Nicaragua, even allowing the existence 
of an opposition party, and it had seats in Congress. Unfortunately, since the military 
played such a big role in the running of the country, and the press was controlled in 
large part by the president, this statement of freedoms appeared false. The growth of 
attacks against the state and head of state showed a growth of the organization of those 
who oppose the regime. As Booth discusses, simply being dissatisfied is not enough. A 
large amount of coordination and organization is required for successful revolutionary 
activities. The growth of organizing mechanisms in the Sandanista movement is shown 
by a growth, not only of revolutionary activities, but the increasing severity of these 
activites. Isolated assassination attempts can easily be disregarded as unrelated to any 
growing national movement. 
An assassination attempt in 1954 showed that there was increasing activity 
among Somoza’s detractors. The assassination attempt created days of turmoil within 
the country, eventually leading to a declaration of martial law in an attempt to retain 
order. This effort was not entirely successful, as at least eight people were killed in the 
attempts to maintain decorum. Six of them were stated to be “rebels” and two were 
members of the National Guard. Days later, three more rebels were killed, two of whom 
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had been officers of the National Guard. One of them was from Costa Rica, which 
seemed to damage already strained relations between the two countries.  
Throughout Somoza’s second term, Nicaragua had issues with other countries in 
the region. Since, as Booth states, there were parallel revolutionary ideas in the area, it 
may have been that preventing a spread of revolution abroad was seen as an attempt to 
also keep it from coming home. Neighboring rebel governments might begin to assist 
revolutionaries and guerrillas within the country (as the Sandinistas did to some extent) 
and lead to greater internal instability. In 1955, Nicaraguan troops invaded Costa Rica, 
after months of turmoil and various allegations. Growth of communism and the receipt 
of Soviet armaments by Guatemala began to erode relations between the two countries, 
especially when some of these arms were alleged to have been found on a Nicaraguan 
beach, after being delivered by submarine.  
After having changed the constitution in 1954 so that he would be able to run 
again, Somoza seemed to have reservations about his candidacy in 1955. Despite acting 
like a candidate who was running, he became harder to reach, and allowed the press to 
raise concerns about his running again. This bred a lot of uncertainty in the country 
about the motives and goals of the president. A large part of the reason for the concern 
was the known limitations on freedom of speech. Despite Somoza’s earlier claim in 1952 
that Nicaraguans had complete freedoms, the press was known to be under strict 
governmental control. Therefore, statements questioning Somoza’s decision to run 
again were taken as confusion on his part. In September of 1956, shortly after having 
been reelected, Somoza was wounded in an assassination attempt and later perished 
from his wounds. His son, Luis Somoza Debayle, took over the presidency.  
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His term too, was fraught with turbulence, including a short-lived revolution in 
1961, after which he passed a law limiting the presidency to four years instead of six, and 
preventing his brother, General Anastasio Debayle, who was the leader of the armed 
forces, from succeeding him before one term had passed. Both elections in the sixties 
were marked with riots and turbulence, showing that the dissatisfaction of the citizens 
had not ceased.  
In Nicaragua, a revolution seemed unavoidable. Decades of guerilla violence and 
dissatisfaction with the Somoza government led inexorably to a governmental 
overthrow. After years of rule by the same family, mainly through the use of the military, 
a natural disaster led to the breaking point. When aid for earthquake recovery was 
instead appropriated by the government, discontent that had been simmering all the 
while came to a boil. The Sandinista movement was formed, named after a famous 
guerilla fighter in Nicaraguan history. They began to wage a guerilla war against the 
Somoza government. Following the assassination of an anti-Somoza newspaper editor, 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the attacks intensified. Within a year, the Somoza 
government had been deposed. Having been a presence in Nicaragua for decades 
(Sandimo, for whom the Sandinistas were named, fought against American Marines in 
the 1950s), The U.S. played a greater role in the revolution in Nicaragua. The human 
rights under the Somoza regime were so deplorable that giving military aid against the 
Sandinista was impossible under the Carter administration. Since Carte had committed 
himself to human rights globally, this was not an occasion where America could fully 
intervene to protect its interests. Instead, advisors and financial support was given to 
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Somoza, and eventually, when it became inevitable, the Sandinista government was 
treated with care but given assistance (Kimmens 1987: 37-41,).  
In this instance too, the situation was complex and tricky. A lack of trust between 
the new leaders in Nicaragua and America was fueled by America’s support of the 
Somoza regime, and American fear of the Marxist roots of the Sandinistas. Both sides 
were afraid that despite a tenuous friendship, the other would suddenly prove their fears 
to be justified. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, Nicaraguan fears began to 
come true.   
The Sandinista government had long expected Washington to create a 
counterrevolution. The Reagan administration wanted to put across a stronger line on 
foreign policy, especially when it pertained to communism. Since the Sandinista 
government had Marxist ideals, it was both viewed by the administration and portrayed 
to the public as being a Soviet-Cuban actor that was deeply involved in the Salvadoran 
revolution, and therefore was exporting violence, revolution, and communism to its 
neighbors. The administration began a course to destroy the Sandinista government 
(Kimmens 1987:37-41).  
First, the last $15 million in aid under Carter was deferred, and thus never 
received by Nicaragua. Then, the new administration began to impose economic 
restrictions on various levels, along with plotting counterrevolution. By being one of the 
main lenders in international lending agencies, America also has a large amount of 
leverage to block aid from international sources. This, when considered along with 
strategies to make Nicaragua less attractive for American investors or lenders, 
decimated the amount of aid that the new government received in 1983. As will be later 
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discussed in Grenada, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries had inherited a country and 
economy that were practically destroyed. Not only was there a lot of international debt 
and little infrastructure, but the country was also physically damaged by the length of 
the war, and the military state that had existed previously, and various natural disasters. 
With no assistance, it would be nearly impossible to rebuild the economy (Kimmens 37-
41, 1987). This would be a useful prevention of progress and a crippling matter to the 
Sandinistas, since part of the public appeal was an attempt to improve economic 
conditions. 
In general, as discussed above under dependency, the U.S. appointed dual 
strategies to pressure governments suspected of communism. This consisted of 
economic pressure by reducing of not granting aid, and political pressure by assisting 
opposition forces within the country. At first, there were some attempts to sway the 
Sandinista government to policies and practices more fitting with American foreign 
policy. This began with various attempts to pressure the new government. One of the 
first strategies attempted was to use the surrounding governments to pressure the 
Sandinistas away from radical changes. The desire of the American government to 
create ties between Nicaragua and other governments, however, also decreased the 
practicality of the overt use of force. At first, the new revolutionary government in 
Nicaragua seemed to be moderate and have reasonable aims. In July 1979, shortly 
before gaining control of the country, promises were made to have the first free elections 
in the country. Problems arose for the U.S. when the government seemed to be moving 
in a leftist direction. Although originally a coalition of forces from various sectors of the 
society, including business people and the Catholic church, once in power there seemed 
David Page 36 
 
to be a change. A main issue was the possibility of support for the overthrow of the 
government in El Salvador, which led to the removal of American aid.  
Reagan agreed with this decision made by Carter, and confirmed it in April of 
1981. About a year later, Nicaragua announced a multi-million dollar agreement for aid 
with the Soviet Union. This show of obvious links to the U.S.S.R. altered relations 
between the U.S. and the Sandinista government. Although President Reagan had 
decided to support the contras in December of 1981, this solidified a necessity of 
undermining the current regime in Nicaragua. Coupled with receipt of armaments from 
communist countries, in part to send to revolutionaries in El Salvador, the new 
Nicaraguan government seemed very dangerous. Reasons for maintaining secrecy, 
however, were numerous. When an admission to assistance of rebel forces in order to 
pressure the government was made, Congress immediately passed an amendment 
disallowing the CIA and Defense Departments from engaging in activities to overthrow 
the Nicaraguan government. Central America was an area where both the Congress and 
the public were paying attention to foreign policy, and for the most part, they were not 
in agreement with what took place. Some of this can be traced to the known human 
rights violations of several of the countries there (Shultz 1993:288-290; Morley 1994: 
223).  
Since priests in Nicaragua had spoken out that under Somoza, torture, rapes, and 
unnecessary killings were taking place, many were apt to view his deposal as a good 
thing for the populace. This made getting support for placing pressure on the new 
government of Nicaragua very difficult. Also, after the Vietnam War and Watergate, 
there was a decrease in trust for the executive, despite Reagan’s efforts to recast both the 
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presidency and Vietnam. Since the United States had officially recognized the 
government of Nicaragua, they were restricted to covert subversion, but it was less than 
successful. Near the end of 1984, both economic pressures and continued support of 
counter-revolutionary elements had not changed anything (Kimmens 1987:60). Added 
to this, the Nicaraguan government did not accept pressure easily from America. In 
early 1983, they accused the U.S. of attempting to damage their economy and of working 
against the government. In 1984, the Nicaraguan government sought the International 
Court of Justice, and the ruling was that all attempts to damage or overthrow the 
government needed to stop (Kimmens 1987: 154-175). These continued actions on the 
part of the Nicaraguan government pretty effectively prevented any overt actions by the 
American government, as did the fact that sufficient instability was never really 
attained. In Grenada, it would seem that there was always a lack of full stability, and 
internal destabilization allowed for immediate military action.  
 
Grenada Case: 
Similar to Somoza, Eric Gairy was involved in the politics of Grenada for decades. 
Although he had created a military state by the time he was ousted by the New Jewel 
Movement, his humble beginnings were populous, and in the name of labor reform. It 
seems ironic that his political beginnings were marked by the same riots and struggles 
for improvement that he put down two decades later.  
In the 1950s, under colonial rule, Gairy was a labor organizer and led protests for 
workers’ rights. In fact, in 1954, when he was elected governor of the island, the British 
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were concerned about his rise to power due to his riotous past. Despite these original 
misgivings, and a turbulent period when the government of Grenada was dissolved in 
1962 on allegations by the British of misuse of money, he remained active in Grenadian 
politics. The election later that year went to Herbert Blaize and the national party. In 
1967, Gairy became the leader of the country once again, and remained in control until 
the coup in 1979.  
Table 2 – Grenada chronology 
1951 Gairy begins to become a known figure and political 
leader – involved in a demonstration 
March 1951 Gairy leads a week – long demonstration and is arrested 
9/24/1954  
Gairy wins 
election 
 
6/18/1962 Grenadian Government is dissolved by the British; Gairy 
suspected of squandering money 
9/13/1962 Gairy loses election and Herbert Blaize is elected Chief 
Minister 
March 1966? Grenada gets home rule and statehood 
8/25/1967 Gairy wins election – Labor party back in power 
1/9/1971 Unrest and demonstrations have been taking place for a 
while in Grenada 
1973 Growth of NJM in opposition to Gairy 
 NJM leaders assaulted 
2/7/1974 Grenadian independence with Gairy as PM 
3/13/1979 NJM overthrows Gairy 
4/16/1979 Grenada and Cuba announce diplomatic relations 
10/16/1979 Coard signs treaty to allow the landing of Soviet planes at 
new airport 
6/21/1980 Attempted assassination of Bishop 
1/1/1981 Bishop gives at speech to fellow Caribbean leaders and 
accuses the U.S. of attempted overthrow 
8/26/1981  U.S. and NATO exercises seen as a practice for invasion 
by Bishop 
2/6/1982 Reagan states a belief that Grenada has joined with the 
U.S.S.R., Cuba,  and Nicaragua to plot Marxism in the 
Western hemisphere 
7/26- Bishop goes to Moscow and creates both political and 
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28/1982 economic agreements with the Soviet Union 
10/1982 Bishop’s leadership criticized and called weak; Coard 
resigns from Cnetral Committee 
11/1982 Other Caribbean Community members attempt to 
convince Grenada to hold free elections 
3/13/1983 Bishop gives a speech condemning American foreign 
policy and increasing the verbal hostility between the 
countries 
3/23/1983 Reagan gives a speech speaking about the impending 
danger of spreading communism in the hemisphere 
5/31-
6/9/1983 
Bishop travels to Washington to meet with National 
Security Advisor and Dep. Secretary of State 
8/26/1983 IMF approves $14.1 loan for PRG 
10/14/1983 Deputy Prime Minister Coard and General Hudson Austin 
place Prime Minister Maurice Bishop under house arrest 
10/18/1983 Whiteman states that he and 3 others resign and that 
Coard is in sole charge of the gov’t 
10/19/1983 Hudson Austin reports the death of Bishop and 3 others 
in the cabinet; many supporters of Bishop are also 
murdered; implementation of “around-the-clock shoot-
on-sight curfew”  
10/21/1983 U.S. announces that 10 ships intended for Lebanon have 
been rerouted to Grenada 
10/23/1983 OECS asks for U.S. help restoring order in Grenada 
10/25/1983 U.S. and other Caribbean troops land in Grenada 
12/3/1984 Herbert Blaize wins elections in Grenada as head of a 
coalition party 
 
 
Starting in the early seventies, various sections and groups in Grenadian society 
began voicing complaints about the government and its use of power. Riots and 
turbulence began in 1971, and the country began to seem unsafe (Todd, 1971:23). Since 
these grievances were not dealt with in a satisfactory manner, the revolutionary ideas 
led ultimately, to a coup. The 1970s were a period of escalation of both revolutionary 
violence and of resistance and repression as the response from the government. This 
seems to follow the pattern in Central America described by Booth, wherein a lack of a 
David Page 40 
 
desired response from the state encourages rather than putting down revolutionaries. 
They feel ignored and marginalized, and rather than becoming afraid to attack again, the 
rebellious factions gather more followers and eventually revolt. 
There are again similarities to the Somoza government as the rebellion began to 
grow. Although any political dissonance was blamed on the opposition party, it seemed 
that various sectors of the society, including a growing class of college – educated youth, 
workers, and nursing students were dissatisfied with the increasingly repressive nature 
of the government. The claimed grievances against the government included that the 
island was a police state, with a secret police force, said to have been composed of 
criminals (Johnson, 1971:12). Despite this, some felt that he attempted good leadership, 
an example of which being his visit to Venezuela in October of 1972. This meeting 
addressed various methods of agricultural growth, and economic expansion, 
culminating by creating a program that would lead to cooperation between the two 
countries(New York Amsterdam News Oct 28, 1972: D15). The opposition to Gairy’s 
rule was growing and becoming more organized, however. As Booth discusses, the 
commonality of having grievances against the state and the fact that the issues had not 
been addressed, led to a consolidation of Gairy’s detractors. In 1973, the New Jewel 
Movement was formed. This year was marked by riots, and the leaders of the Movement 
were alleged to have been beaten by the secret police. One of the main grievances 
against Gairy at this time was the push for full independence from the British 
(Lewis,1987:18, Heine, 1990:14) .  
Independence was obtained on February 7, 1974, and had been negotiated in 
large part by Prime Minister Gairy. Since home rule and partial statehood had been 
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granted by Britain to the island in 1966, total independence seemed not to be a pressing 
need. Many of those opposed to the idea acknowledged that little would change, in 
respect to trade relations with Britain, and the social and political hierarchy within the 
island. Therefore, full independence seemed like a formality only, and there were better 
ways of directing this energy. No longer having a final check on decisions made was of 
primary concern to those who felt that Gairy’s abuses would only grow without London’s 
oversight. His decision not to consult the citizens of Grenada on this important decision, 
and to nearly unilaterally decide that it would be a good thing for the country was to 
many another example of how little Gairy acknowledged the people of Grenada (Heine, 
1990: 12). It appeared to some that part of the motivation for independence was power, 
especially since it appeared that Gairy had a history of misusing power – the 
government was disbanded by London in 1961 because he was accused of appropriating 
public funds. Although many felt that independence was not harmful in itself, the way in 
which it was implemented led to greater concerns about the fitness of Gairy to rule. 
Even the celebrations for independence included rioting, as dissidents expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way in which it had been attained (New York Amsterdam News 
(1962-1993). New York, N.Y.: Jan 26, 1974. p. A1). In fact, as independence celebrations 
were underway, Maurice bishop was arrested, it seems mostly for his role in leading the 
opposition to Gairy’s rule.  
Both riots and political actions by the NJM increased throughout the seventies. 
In 1976, several candidates ran in the election, and they formed the majority of the 
opposition in the Parliament constructed after this election. Eventually, however, they 
did not feel that they were making sufficient headway through these means. On March 
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13, 1979, while Gairy was attending a United Nations meeting in New York, the NJM 
surrounded the army barracks and took over the country in a coup that was marked by 
its lack of bloodshed (Heine 1991:14, Shultz 1993:324).  
The foreign policy pursued by the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG – 
formerly the NJM) gave America ample reason to believe that it was a possible threat as 
a communist stronghold Not only did the PRG have a communist agenda and 
institution, it had ties to both the Soviet Union and Cuba (Morales 1994; Heine 1991). . 
Almost immediately after seizing power, diplomatic relations with Cuba were declared 
on April 16, 1979(Seabury & McDougall 1984:10). The New Jewel Movement (which 
became the PRG when it seized power) modeled itself on Marxist-Leninist views, and 
desired to improve Grenada’s economic and social climate. The Gairy regime was both 
corrupt and oppressive, and Maurice Bishop sought to bring change to the island. A 
young intellectual who had studied in the United Kingdom, he was surrounded by like-
minded fellow dissenters, who also wanted reform (Morales 1994; Heine 1991). They 
started off as protestors that Gairy did not want to listen to, and eventually decided that 
protesting alone was not enough. Since these protests and the desires of the public were 
not being taken seriously by the democratically-elected Gairy, they decided to take 
control of the island’s government, and implement reforms intended to improve the 
country (Joefield Napier 1991:88-104).  
The New Jewel Movement looked at the various problems of the society. It 
intended modifications in every sector, including health care, education, and decreasing 
unemployment. In the seventies, the Grenadian economy was very unstable, mostly due 
to structural failures. A lack of structures set up to improve tourism and agriculture, led 
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to instability in these areas, especially since agriculture can be so easily affected by 
weather and external pricing. In Latin America, modernization and moving away from 
mostly agricultural products is difficult at best. Because there is a demand for the 
exports of these countries (sugar, fruit, spices), there is little incentive for the U.S. to 
have them reduce the agricultural sector of their economy. (Joefield Napier 89-102, 
1991).  
A lack of internal cohesion in the leadership of the New Jewel Movement led to 
its eventual demise, as there were two factions, espousing different ideologies. On one 
hand, some members did hold communist, Leninist views, mostly in the faction led by 
Coard, which staged an internal coup and assassinated nearly half of the government. 
The faction led by Bishop, seemed to be more concerned with the needs of the island 
and the people, than with implementing strongly socialist policies. Opinions differ as to 
whether the movement was intentionally socialist, or whether this seemed to be the only 
escape route from capitalism that was not highly beneficial to them. Certainly it had 
strongly socialist ties, which, given the time period, would be concerning at best to 
Washington. Whether or not the PRC began socialist, it eventually made ties with 
various known socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.  
In July of 1982, an agreement was signed between the U.S.S.R. Grenada, 
discussing the transfer of arms, the training of Grenadian military in the Soviet Union, 
and of sending officials to Grenada. Based on the factors described above, this definitely 
shows linkage to the Soviet Union, and therefore, in the bipolar Cold War world, makes 
Grenada a threat. The possibility of a Soviet post does not seem far-fetched, despite the 
paranoia of the times, as this shows that there was a multi-level agreement between 
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Grenada and the U.S.S.R. This is furthered by the fact that the Soviet Union was willing 
to absorb a substantial amount of the costs incurred, including the travel, training, and 
living expenses for Grenadian military personnel in the U.S.S.R.  
Grenada was also shown to be forming alliances with various other communist 
countries, including the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and Castro in Cuba. These links, 
along with the presence of advisors and armed forces from other communist countries, 
help to justify American fears not only of revolutions, but that this case, specifically, was 
of a communist nature. Throughout the rule of the PRG, Grenada faced pressure and 
disapproval form other Caribbean nations. Many were shocked at what was the first 
coup in the English-speaking Caribbean, and also felt that free elections should be held. 
Even at the end, just prior to the invasion, other Caribbean states sought American 
assistance in restoring order. This is a marked difference from Nicaragua, which had 
stronger ties to other neighboring countries, and also a more stable government. Also, 
immediate ties to communism left no doubt about the future of the regime. Unlike the 
Sandinistas, who began with a desire for democracy and therefore were treated with 
hopeful skepticism, Grenada’s immediate ties with Cuba left no room for such niceties. 
Instead the U.S. government intermittently ignored and accused the PRG of spreading 
communism in the region (Pastor 1991: 200). Beginning in 1982, however, the Reagan 
administration clearly denounced Grenada as a leftist and destructive influence in the 
region.  
In the beginning of 1983, relations continued to be verbally hostile. Other 
regional governments disapproved of the methods, saying that the Reagan 
administration was too extreme. The lack of democracy in Grenada was a concern, 
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however, especially since the PRG ignored suggestions from other regional governments 
to hold elections. The failure to do this, and the impounding of those deemed dangerous 
to the government, all served to distance Grenada from other nations of the English-
speaking Caribbean. The internal struggles within the party – some felt Bishop was too 
soft, others were pressuring him to release political prisoners and normalize relations 
with the U.S., eventually gave the Reagan administration the chance it required. The trip 
made by Bishop to the U.S. in June did not seem to change relations much. Instead, they 
remained strained, and relations within Grenada seemed to worsen. By October of 1983, 
the PRG seemed to be splitting apart due to in-fighting, as Bishop was placed under 
house arrest, and then Coard, who had resigned only days earlier, was declared to be in 
sole charge of the government. The situation immediately worsened, and gave the U.S. a 
window of opportunity for military intervention.  
The October 19, 1983 assassination of Bishop, other members of his cabinet, and 
various supporters among the people, left Grenada in a chaotic state. With the 
implementation of the “around-the-clock shoot-on-sight curfew (Shultz 1993:325)”, 
concern for the medical students was justifiable. This presented an opportunity for the 
removal of a dangerous regime, which was becoming increasingly leftist and violent. At 
the same time, fellow Caribbean nations, feeling that the situation in Grenada was out of 
control, asked for American assistance in restoring order (Shultz 1993: 346; Seabury & 
McDougall 1984:11-12).  On October 23, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
petitioned Washington for this assistance, and on October 25, it was granted. The 
general unpopularity of Coard, contrasted with the high public opinion of Bishop, made 
the reaction of the island’s citizens to the invasion more favorable. Since elections were 
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restored and democracy renewed in 1984 victory of Herbert Blaize as a coalition 
candidate, it could be justified that the American military involvement actually did 
assist in returning it to the island (New York Times (1923-Current file). Dec 4, 1984. p. 
A14).  
 
Conclusions: 
 Given the Cold War mentality of paranoia and the fear that the Soviet Union was 
looking for a base in the Western Hemisphere, intervention of some sort from America 
was to be expected. Latin American revolutions were a cause of destabilization within a 
region a region that America had long felt a need to protect. Instability was seen as 
dangerous, since it could lead to a power vacuum. Also, especially during the Reagan 
administration, revolutions and upheavals within the region were believed to have 
Soviet and Cuban backing. In the cases studied here, the revolutionaries certainly did 
have ties to both countries, so this may not have been that much of a stretch. Allowing 
communism in Latin America was opposed to U.S. national security goals. Containment 
required both prevention of the spread of communism, and securing areas that were of 
geopolitical interest. Communist revolutions in Latin America were therefore on both 
counts an issue that needed to be resolved. Thus these governments had to either be 
dissuaded from their less than capitalistic paths, or else deposed. Communist 
revolutions were also seen as being dangerous for the countries involved, as mentioned 
above by Kirkpatrick. The changes brought about would still come with abuses of power, 
and will reduce the comfortable familiarities that stood under dictators that were part of 
the previous system.  
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The atmosphere after both Vietnam and Watergate was to both curb the 
executive branch and for Congress to take a more active role in foreign policy. During 
the eighties, covert intervention was very prevalent in Central America because of the 
heavy scrutiny, both on the executive and the region. It was generally a pattern in the 
region due to the close political and economic ties that America historically had with the 
area. In order for the other countries not to feel threatened or that the United States was 
taking too strong of a position, overt action had to be limited. Maintaining governments 
that were not hostile to American safety, however, was also important. As Kirkpatrick 
described above, dictators who were part of the culture were felt to be less harmful, even 
to those they governed. Seen as being less repressive and stringent than communists, 
they were also credited with being more stable. Since the majority of communist 
governments had come about due to revolutions, they often took some time to become 
stabilized. The fact that a revolution had taken place however, seems to show that the 
previous government had at least become destabilized.  
 These factors led to a regional pattern of either supporting autocrats, like 
Somoza, or of using covert means to remove communist revolutionary governments. It 
would seem that a few key differences and opportunities led to the use of force in 
Grenada, although the regional pattern, which was displayed in Nicaragua, was covert 
action and subversion. Although both countries showed links to the Soviet Union and 
Cuba, Grenada had continually been more overt in anti-American rhetoric, whereas the 
Nicaraguan government mostly made accusations and not just inflammatory 
statements. In Grenada, it was more difficult to initiate covert operations, partly because 
of the small size of the island and partly because most possible oppositions to the 
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government had previously been arrested (Pastor 1991:208). Therefore, America had 
limited methods of either affecting a change to a more central ideology, or of assisting 
pressures on the government without direct military action. Although this may have 
been the only viable solution, certainly various situations made it more likely, including 
the second coup. The mostly young, college-educated PRG seemed to be heavily 
influenced by Marxism-Leninism, and neglected any original show of maintaining 
relations with America. Instead, these relations were strained from the start, as relations 
with Cuba were declared only days after the government came to power. Also, Grenada 
had much weaker ties to its fellow Caribbean countries after the revolution. Many felt 
that elections needed to be held and did not approve of the revolution. Also, the PRG did 
not strengthen many of these ties during its reign, reaching out instead to other 
communist and revolutionary governments, to which it felt more connected. The lack of 
attempts at diplomatic relations with America gave the government less legitimacy.  
This made Grenada seem more likely to become a Soviet base in the West. There 
were other signs of this possibility, including the building of and an international 
airport, and the strong ties to Cuba. Both Cuban military advisors and personnel were 
present in Grenada. The strength of Soviet influence increased drastically as Bishop was 
overthrown. The faction led by Coard was even more strongly influenced by the Soviet 
Union and Marxism-Leninism. This meant that covert pressure were even less likely to 
be successful in swaying the government, although Coard’s lack of popularity could have 
provided the basis for yet another revolt. The paranoia that had caused political 
opponents of the PRG to be incarcerated, however, had increased, and the fact that the 
entire island was under lockdown seemed to show this.  
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In Nicaragua, there were several reasons why overt intervention would not have 
been viable. As a start, before gaining power, the Sandinistas promised elections, and 
the revolutionary forces included people from many different socio-economic 
backgrounds. The government was recognized by the U.S. and had close ties with many 
other countries in the region. Central America in particular was being closely scrutinized 
by Congress – the arms and money given to the Contras were done so without 
congressional approval and against Congressional order. Actual invasion would not only 
have been unconstitutional if ordered by Reagan, but would have damaged American 
relations with the rest of Latin America as well. Also, a conflict in Nicaragua was likely 
to be long and reminiscent of Vietnam – prior to the overthrow of Somoza, the 
Sadinistas had been a long – struggling guerrilla force. Along with this, the government 
and internal situation of Nicaragua were far more stable than in Grenada. Both had 
economic issues which led to the revolutions, but the second coup in Grenada created 
massive destabilization, and divorced the government from the people.  
 Overall, the factors came together in such a fashion that October 1983 was a 
perfect time for military action in Grenada that would have very few repercussions. The 
island was heavily destabilized, had lost all support of its nearest neighbors, and did not 
have a very large fighting force. There were also plausible reasons for an American 
invasion (the students of the medical school). There was not a strong army, meaning 
that the action would be over quickly, and there was a real emergency. This would 
decrease internal repercussions from Congress and the public, and the dissatisfaction of 
the people of Grenada with the events leading up to the invasion, as well as the 
disapproval of the other islands of the PRG would decrease external consequences.  
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In contrast, the government of Nicaragua was backed by a large fighting force, 
which had fought more than a year to simply overthrow the Somoza regime. This meant 
that both the public and the Congress would see involvement here as similar to Vietnam, 
and at best a civil war in which Americans had no place. Since the Congress did not 
approve of covert action against the Sandinista government, it is highly unlikely that 
they would have approved an over military presence. A large part of the foreign policy of 
the Reagan administration was reaction to Vietnam, a sure win in Grenada was 
infinitely preferable to an interminable struggle in Nicaragua. With the war lasting only 
a few days in Grenada, and the crisis situation that prevailed in the island, it could well 
be seen as assisting democracy and preventing communism from taking root. Since 
elections followed within months and there was a return to democratic governmental 
change, it would be difficult to argue that this was not at least an outcome, even if not 
the only goal.  Not only did Nicaragua never become sufficiently destabilized, but it also 
managed to get a ruling against the U.S. to stop actions to destabilize it in the 
International Court of Justice. This government was not going to be easily overthrown, 
and if an attempt was made, American credibility would be damaged, when a large goal 
of the administration was to improve this and show that communism would not be 
allowed in the American sphere.  
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